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ABSTRACT  
In this paper, I answer the question of what time is. First, however, I consider why one 
might ask this question and what exactly it is asking. The latter consideration reveals that 
in order to answer the question, one must first engage in a more basic investigation of what 
a thing, anything at all, is. Such radical investigation requires a special methodology. After 
briefly characterizing this methodology, I show how it can be employed to answer the 
titular question. This answer is significant not merely because it illuminates something of 
perennial interest, but because it is essential to a comprehensive and fully satisfactory 
metaphysics of time and, hence, to a view of the full structure in reality. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Despite the salience of time in one’s life and its centrality to the work 
of scientists and philosophers, the titular question is rarely (if ever) posed.  
Of course, in the midst of cosmological ruminations, Augustine famously 
asks “What, then, is time?”1.  But this is more of a rhetorical cri de coeur 
than the initiation of an ontological inquiry.  What Augustine goes on to 
say—“If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, 
                                                 
1 See his Confessions, Book XI, Chapter XIV. 
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I know not.”—is surely misleading.  The problem is not just one of 
articulation.  One could hardly have firm beliefs regarding such an abstruse 
matter as what time is prior to a good deal of metaphysical reflection.  
Even appreciating this, though, it is not obvious how such reflection 
should be directed. 
In this paper, I answer the question of what time is.  First, however, I 
consider why one might ask this question and what exactly it is asking.  
The latter consideration reveals that in order to answer the question, one 
must first engage in a more basic investigation of what a thing, anything at 
all, is.  Such radical investigation requires a special methodology.  After 
briefly characterizing this methodology, I show how it can be employed 
to answer the titular question.  This answer is significant not merely 
because it illuminates something of perennial interest, but because it is 
essential to a comprehensive and fully satisfactory metaphysics of time 
and, hence, to a view of the full structure in reality. 
 
 
I. Why might one ask this question? 
  
One need have no clear sense of time to wonder what it is—if one is 
just taking it to be closely related to change.  Change occurs when a thing is 
one way, then another, incompatible way.  All the changes one experiences 
or undergoes, taken together, are one’s life.  So, if change and time are so 
closely related that the former requires the latter, without time, there would 
be no lives.  Change is the stimulus for some of the most poignant 
emotions associated with life, bringing about nostalgia and prompting 
expectation.  Moreover, if it is experiencing a preponderance of agreeable 
changes that provides satisfaction and if striving to effect certain changes 
is what gives one purpose, then both the quality and the very meaning of 
life are bound up with change and so with time.  It is natural, then, for any 
contemplative person to consider what this is that is so important to life, 
especially when one suspects these changes and, thus, this life to be finite. 
For these reasons, laypersons are intrigued by time.  Others with more 
specialized interests might be as well.  Chemists and biologists who study 
processes of various sorts and physicists who presume that the 
fundamental structure of the universe is to be characterized in terms of 
  What is time? 45 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 40, n. 1, pp. 43-65, jan.-mar. 2017. 
space-time take time for granted.  They might, in a reflective moment, 
wonder what it is.  There are also different areas of philosophy that rely 
on time in obvious or subtle ways.  Consider the philosophy of history, 
which examines how what was contributed to what is and what this reveals 
about what will or might be.  Consider action theory, in particular, 
questions regarding free will that examine whether one’s choices now can 
contribute to what will be, or whether what is to come was settled long 
ago.  There are metaphysical questions, pertaining to causation and laws 
of nature, that examine how things develop and meta-ethical questions 
about whether the rightness of an action is to be accounted for in terms 
of the goodness that subsequently comes from it.  Surely the work of all 
those engaged in such inquiry could benefit from an account of what time 
is and how it contributes to the world.2 
While it is plausible that the work of many would benefit from asking 
the question of what time is, this question seems crucial to the work of 
others.  There is, after all, an area of inquiry ostensibly directed at time—
the philosophy of time—in which philosophers purport to investigate, among 
other issues, the structure or extent of time; its topology; whether it has a 
direction; how things change and, hence, exist in or through time; what 
properties things bear just in virtue of being in time (or whether they 
merely stand in distinctively temporal relations); how one experiences 
time; whether one can travel in it; whether it in some sense “passes”.  It 
seems clear that none of these issues could be resolved without first having 
an account of what time is.  For example, one cannot say what the 
structure of time is unless one has an account of what it is (and, hence, 
knows that time is the kind of thing that is structured). 
It is surprising, then, that the aforementioned issues, concerning 
putative features of time or matters associated with it, dominate the 
philosophy of time.  Indeed, an examination of the voluminous literature 
on time shows that the primary question of what time is is no part of the 
disputes that exercise philosophers of time.  Nonetheless, if a 
comprehensive metaphysics of time is to be attained, with all the insight 
                                                 
2 In Fiocco 2013, I argue that considering the world in time presents formidable 
challenges for the meta-ethical position of consequentialism. 
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into the many issues that depend on time that it would provide, it must 
begin with this question. 
 
 
II. What is this question asking? 
 
Say one agrees that the question of what time is is worth asking.  Still, 
it might not be clear what it is asking.  If the only handle one has on time 
is its close relation to change, and change is such a pervasive part of one’s 
life, it might be hard to discern the focus of the question in order to begin 
answering it. 
In some cases in which one asks what something is, to be told the kind 
of thing that thing is suffices to answer one’s question, if that kind is at 
the appropriate level of generality and one has a clear enough sense of 
what it is to be of that kind.  In other cases, though, a thing might be of 
no specific kind, it might not be an instance of any kind more limited than 
the summum genus of thing, (i.e., being, entity, existent).  In other words, it might 
be sui generis, the only thing like it, in any robust sense, in the world.  Were 
this so, to answer the question of what that thing is would require an 
illuminating account of that thing itself, an account that articulates the 
definitive features of that thing. 
So the titular question might be asking for the statement of some kind 
or for an account of time per se, depending on whether time is an instance 
of some kind or is sui generis.  Before determining whether it is the former 
or the latter, however, one must determine whether time is anything at all.  
It might not be obvious that it is.  There is undoubtedly change, but one 
might be doubtful that in addition to all the conspicuous changes in the 
world there is something—literally a thing, to wit, time—underlying or 
otherwise related to these changes.  Therefore, prior to the question of 
what time is, is the question of whether time is a thing. 
Of course, this question can only be answered if one has some account 
of what a thing (i.e., an entity, an existent, a being)—in the most general and 
inclusive sense—is.  All inquiry is directed at something or other, more 
precisely, at the relations between kinds of thing or particular ones.  
Inquiry takes things for granted.  Although knowing what a thing is might 
be unnecessary for successful inquiry in most domains, if one’s goal is 
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understanding—knowledge of what exactly it is one is investigating, whether 
it must be as it is and why—then one needs such an account of thing.  This 
account would reveal what each thing ultimately is and how things in 
general do (and could) relate.  Understanding the world or the 
fundamental structure in reality is presumably the goal of metaphysics in 
the grand sense, and so an account of thing is indispensable to it. 
Since any sort of familiar inquiry takes things for granted, if one is to 
attain an account of what a thing is, one must engage in a special sort of 
inquiry.  One needs a unique methodology.  I discuss elsewhere what 
seems to me to be the requisite methodology, which I dub original inquiry.3  
Here it suffices merely to sketch this methodology and present its upshot.  
If the goal of original inquiry is an account of what a thing is, one cannot 
presume at the outset anything about any thing, not even that things exist.  
With such a severe constraint, it might seem that there is no way to 
proceed for it might seem that one has forfeited all means of inquiry. 
However, even if one eschews everything and with it any assumption 
that might prejudice or otherwise taint this special sort of inquiry into each 
thing, one is not without a focus with which to start.  One still has the 
world:  all this, the heterogeneous array encompassing one.  Were one to 
avail oneself of the assumptions, and the concepts arising from them, that 
one forgoes in original inquiry, one could characterize this array as a 
mélange of shapes and colors and odors and textures and sounds and 
cognitive, conative and affective feels.  But here, presuming nothing about 
the world—not even that “it” is a thing—the world is to be regarded merely 
as the impetus to inquiry. 
The world as the impetus to inquiry is no hypothesis, it is an 
indubitable prerequisite of any inquiry at all.  In confronting the impetus 
to inquiry, one makes no assumption about what, if anything, exists.  
Nevertheless, this, the world, is a certain way.  There must be some 
explanation for how the world is as it is.  This is just the claim that there 
is some apt characterization, in terms of what exists, of this; hence, the 
claim should not be deemed contentious.  Such a characterization would 
illuminate how this is as it is.  Were there no such explanation, there could 
be no successful inquiry.  Inquiry is directed either at the world at large or 
                                                 
3 See my “What Is a Thing?” (under review). 
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at some localized phenomenon.  Successful inquiry into the latter, which 
would provide an account of how that phenomenon is, would depend on 
some account of the former, since any localized phenomenon is subsumed 
by the world.  Therefore, any explanation of any phenomenon at all rests 
on some explanation of the world being as it is; the very possibility of 
successful inquiry requires such an explanation.  If there are reasons for 
being dubious about the possibility of successful inquiry, they arise in light 
of concerns about the elusiveness of the world, the inaccessibility of things 
or the fallibility of minds, but such concerns have no force here, where 
nothing is being assumed about the world (or things or minds).  In original 
inquiry, there is no breach between so-called appearance and reality and 
so skepticism has not even a toehold. 
An explanation for how the world is as it is must be based on 
something.  Indeed, any explanation must have a basis: one could not have 
a genuine explanation that is vacuously representational, one that would 
explain in terms of nothing at all.  There must be something or other—
the explanans—that in virtue of its relation to what is to be explained—
the explanandum—illuminates the latter.  Such a view of explanation is 
hardly controversial.  Thus, although confronting the world brings with it 
no ontological commitment, recognizing that this, the impetus to inquiry, 
must have some explanation does.  The first ontological principle in 
inquiry is that there is something that underlies an account of how the 
world is as it is. 
This raises the question of what a thing must be in order to serve as 
the ontological basis of at least a partial explanation for how the world is 
as it is.  As the basis of such an explanation, a thing bears some relation to 
the world; in this sense, it is in the world, making some contribution to all 
this.  If it did not make the contribution it does, it would be nothing at all.  
Moreover, its contribution is unique.  Were some other thing to make its 
contribution, it itself would not be making one.  Consequently, there is no 
thing that makes another thing be or be what it is.  Were there such a 
thing, the very existence of the latter—and, hence, the contribution it 
makes to the world—would be attributable to the former. In other words, 
were a thing made to be, “it” would be ontologically idle and, thus, 
nothing.  The world would not be as it is, even in part, because of “it”, but 
because of whatever is supposed to make “it” be.  I have argued, on the 
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basis of such considerations4, that each thing is fundamental, in that no 
other thing can explain the existence of a thing or what it is (since its being 
what it is is attendant upon its very existence).  Things provide the means 
of explanation yet also its limits; things explain but are themselves 
inexplicable, that is, they are not even susceptible to explanation. 
A thing contributes to the world as the basis of at least a partial 
explanation for how the world is as it is.  Thus, each thing must be some 
way(s) or other.  Were a thing no way at all, there would be nothing to it, 
in which case, it could not serve as the ontological basis of any explanation.  
What a thing is determines, to a significant extent, how it is; how it is are 
the ways it is.  Since nothing explains what a thing is and, hence, the ways 
that it is, each thing just is what it is.  A thing cannot exist without being 
what it is; its very existence, then, requires that it be at least some of the 
ways it is.  Therefore, each thing is constrained in its being, it must be 
certain ways just in virtue of existing.  In this sense, each thing is natured.  
If there be familiar concrete objects, universal properties (i.e., attributes), 
particular properties (i.e., modes or tropes), relations, universal kinds, 
numbers, propositions, processes, facts, states of affairs, sets, holes, 
boundaries, privations—what have you—each is natured.  It is misleading, 
however, to say that each thing has a nature, for this suggests that a nature 
is a thing (something to be had) in virtue of which a thing is or is what it 
is.  But, as argued above, there can be no such thing that explains or 
grounds another.  For similar reasons, it is misleading to talk of the essence 
of a thing.  There are no essences, though each thing is, nonetheless, many 
ways essentially.  Although everything must be certain ways (depending on 
what it is), many things can also come to be and cease to be other ways 
they do not have to be.  These other ways, though, must be consistent 
with those ways a thing must be just in virtue of existing at all. 
A thing, therefore, is a natured entity.  Elsewhere5, I consider whether 
the obvious circularity of this account of thing is problematic, and conclude 
                                                 
4 See my “Each Thing Is Fundamental: Against Hylomorphism and Hierarchical 
Structure” (under review). 
5 See my “What Is a Thing?” (under review). 
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that it is not.  The account is informative in light of the world, the 
ineluctable impetus to inquiry. 
 
 
III. How should one go about answering it? 
  
As noted in the previous section, prior to the question of what time is, 
is the question of whether time is a thing at all.  I then presented an 
account of what a thing is.  If there is any insightful account of time itself, 
time must be a natured entity.  One must determine, then, whether this is 
the case.  Presumably any grounds for maintaining that time is indeed a 
thing would also inform the account of what it is.  To look for such 
grounds, one might begin by examining how time is regarded, what it is 
taken to be. 
Most who regard time do not go beyond the sense, acknowledged 
above, that it has something to do with change.  This sense alone, 
obviously, is too vague to reveal much of anything about time per se.  If 
pressed, a layperson might offer an observation like time is what makes one 
grow old or what clocks measure.  But what makes one grow old are the features 
of one’s organs or cells; it is their limited durability, that is, the incapacity 
of these things to preserve their integrity as they interact with other things 
and undergo their characteristic changes.  It is not time itself that makes 
one age, it is the changes one undergoes given what one’s body, organs, 
and cells are.  If time is relevant here at all, it is because it has something 
to do with change, and so this homely suggestion about time and growing 
old provides no more insight into time than the vague sense with which 
one began.  Clocks are just machines with cycles coordinated with cycles 
in other things, usually naturally occurring ones.  If clocks measure 
anything they measure these other cycles.  A cycle is just a reoccurring 
series of changes in some thing (or things).  So if a clock is simply a means 
of marking such changes, then, again, one has a suggestion about time that 
provides no more insight then one had to begin with.  The claim that a 
clock does not measure only cyclical changes, but also what those changes 
take place in presents an helpful spatial metaphor.  Until one has grounds 
for maintaining that time is a thing—and a literal account of what it is 
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based upon such grounds—no metaphor can really be illuminating.  Such 
grounds do not seem to be forthcoming from casual reflection on time. 
One might think, then, that the cogitations of experts would be more 
promising.  However, as mentioned above, the question of what time is is 
not central to the philosophy of time.  This claim might be perplexing, and 
not merely because this question is the most obvious one to try to answer 
if one is interested in the philosophy of time.  The claim might be 
perplexing also because discussions of the metaphysics of time are almost 
always presented in a context in which there are supposed to be competing 
theories of time.  Every issue is approached in light of the A-theory versus the 
B-theory or the tensed theory versus the tenseless theory or the block theory versus 
the passage theory or presentism versus eternalism, etc.  Indeed, when 
considering the philosophy of time at large, one is confounded by what 
appears to be a host of theories of time.   
Although there are these many so-called theories of time, those who 
propound them never make explicit what it is exactly they are theories of.  
Still, even if they are there only tacitly, one might hope, by examining such 
theories, to uncover grounds that indicate whether time is a thing and 
some insight into what this thing is.  The first point to note when 
considering these theories is that none of the terms used to name them—
‘A-theory’, ‘the tenseless theory’, ‘presentism’, etc.—is univocal.  Each has 
been used for distinct theories (some of which are incompatible).  Suppose 
though that the (or an) A-theory is a view according to which there is an 
infinite series of moments, each one of which bears an absolute monadic 
temporal property being past, being present, or being future, in addition to 
standing in binary temporal relations, to wit, earlier than and later than, to 
other moments.  This theory can be contrasted with one, the B-theory, on 
which there is this infinite series of moments, but the moments only stand 
in binary temporal relations.  Both are theories of what (temporal) 
properties or relations moments, in an infinite series, bear.  Suppose the 
(or a) tenseless theory is a view on which things do not come into being, 
but merely exist permanently at some temporal location; whereas the (or 
a) tensed theory is a view on which things do, in some sense, come into 
being.  Both of these are theories of how things exist, or how they come 
to exist.  Not one of these four theories is about time per se and so they 
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are of little help in determining whether time is a thing.  The same holds 
for other putative theories of time. 
Nevertheless, given the theories just considered, one might surmise 
that what time is is a plurality of related moments, either an infinite series 
of them (each of which might or might not bear an absolute monadic 
temporal property) or the totality of temporal locations comprising some 
lesser array (in which things exist with or without becoming).6  Setting 
aside that it is by no means clear what a moment is, if this is what time 
were, time would not be a thing.  A plurality, which is many, is not any 
one, natured entity.  (This is not to say that a natured entity cannot be 
complex; a complex thing is one yet with many parts.)  There is nothing 
that makes a thing be or be what it is; each natured entity just is and is as 
it is essentially because it is.  However, a plurality is made to be (and made 
to be what it is) by the many things that compose it, and a plurality is as it 
is because these things are as they are.  A plurality makes no contribution 
to the world beyond those made by the things it includes.  If there were 
some way a seeming plurality were that made such a contribution, this 
would be some indication that that “plurality” were in fact a thing.  Such 
a way would have to be more than some contrived feature, like being 
multitudinous or being multi-located, based on the presumption that the 
plurality is indeed a unified thing.  If time were a plurality of moments, 
there is no obvious feature of the world that could be explained by it rather 
than those moments. 
It is, however, not tenable to maintain that time is just a plurality of 
moments and so nothing in itself.  A significant position in the 
metaphysics of time is presentism.  Although there are a great variety of 
presentist views, the most promising ones deny that there is any array of 
moments.  Yet proponents of such views do not reject time itself.  Any 
such presentist accepts that time exists just as much as any A- or B-theorist 
or tensed or tenseless theorist, etc.  What all these metaphysician of time 
agree upon—and it might be the only thing—is that time is real.  What 
                                                 
6 Some make a claim like this one explicit.  See, for example, Tallant 2013: 372 for 
the assertion that, on the B-theory, the “reality of time consists in nothing more 
than various objects standing in the ‘fixed and permanent’ relations earlier than 
and later than.” 
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they disagree about are the things associated with time or the relations, the 
structure, among these things.  Thus, all these purported theories of time 
are actually theories of what can be construed more broadly as temporal 
reality, each of which takes for granted the existence of time.  The questions 
remain, though, of what it is each is taking for granted and what motivates 
all these controversial theories of temporal reality. 
There is a long-standing debate in the metaphysics of time, one 
predating the modern proliferation of theories of temporal reality, that 
seems to pertain to the key question of whether time is a thing.  This 
debate, concerning relationism versus substantivalism, is supposed to be about 
whether time is a substance and, hence, a thing.  According to relationists, 
time is nothing distinct from all the occurrences that take place in the 
world and the relations among them.  According to substantivalists, time 
is a thing in addition to all these occurrences; in particular, it is the thing 
in which these occurrences take place and exists independently of them.  
Relationism cannot offer any insight into time per se.   On this view, time 
is, at most, a plurality: all occurrences, that is, all changing things and the 
relations among them.  As such, time is nothing in itself.  Substantivalism 
does not provide any more insight.  Although on this view, time is 
supposed to be a thing, the account of what it is—the “container” or 
“arena” in which all occurrences take place—seems to be just (a spatial) 
metaphor.  A literal account of what this “container” is, if indeed there is 
one, would presumably characterize it as an array of moments.  Setting 
aside, again, that it is not at all clear what a moment is, an array of anything 
(moments or what have you) is merely a plurality, not anything in itself.  
On neither side of the debate, then, is time really a natured entity.   
This debate between relationists and substantivalists is often motivated 
with the question of whether time could exist in the absence of any 
occurrences or changes.  If the answer to this question is negative, then 
time is supposed just to be any occurrences (or changes) and their 
relations.  (But this does not follow—even if time could not exist without 
occurrences, it need not be those occurrences.)  If the answer is affirmative, 
time is supposed to be something, whatever it is, distinct from all those 
occurrences.  Regardless of one’s answer, however, I want to point out the 
futility of raising this question prior to having an account of what time is 
or being able to say whether it is a thing.  Without such an account (or 
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argument), one is no position to determine whether time must exist with 
changes or could exist in their absence.  In general, without some clear 
sense of what a thing is, one cannot say what that thing must exist with or 
can exist without.  As observed above, one’s untutored sense of time is 
that it has something to do with change, but this sense is surely not 
sufficient to determine whether it is something that must exist with 
changes or is really anything at all.  Hence, this debate between relationists 
and substantivalists reveals nothing about time, neither what it is nor even 
its status as a thing. 
One does not get an answer to the question of whether time is a thing 
by considering what laypersons might say about it, nor even by considering 
the voluminous literature produced by philosophers of time.  Without any 
grounds for maintaining that time is a thing, one can hardly answer the 
question of what time is.  One needs, therefore, a different strategy to get 
purchase on time, one that goes beyond casual reflection—consulting 
one’s “intuitions”—or examining the work of experts.  If time is real and 
is as vital to the world, and one’s experience of it, as it seems to be, one 
should expect to find some indication of this thing in original inquiry, that 
is, when confronting the world without presumption.  Any such indication 
should provide the means to illuminate the sense that time has something 
to do with change. 
In confronting the world simply as the impetus to inquiry, one is 
indeed impressed by a world that can be as it is only if it includes a thing 
plausibly taken to be time.  To answer the question of what time is, 
therefore, one must begin here, with original inquiry. 
 
 
IV. The Answer 
  
When one undertakes original inquiry, one encounters a heterogeneous 
array: the world that is thus.  If one undertakes original inquiry again, one 
encounters a distinct heterogeneous array: the world as so.  The world is 
thus and (then) so.  There are, then, two modes of differentiation in the 
world.  The heterogeneity apparent when it was just thus and the 
heterogeneity apparent in its being thus and (then) so.  The first mode of 
differentiation can be accounted for simply in terms of the existence of 
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distinct of things.  This second mode is no less incontrovertible than the 
first, so it, too, must have an explanation and, hence, an ontological basis. 
Call the natured entity underlying the explanation for this second mode 
of differentiation time.  This is, then, a preliminary answer to the titular 
question.  Time is that thing that accounts for the world being 
differentiated in the distinct ways that it obviously is.  This initial 
characterization is fitting because if change genuinely occurs in the world, 
it does so via this second mode of differentiation; this second mode is 
needed for there to be change.  Thus, in a way to be elaborated, time is 
the thing that makes change possible.  The sense that change has 
something to do with time is thereby corroborated, for there is this very 
close relationship between time and change. 
The better one illuminates change and how it is made possible, the 
more insight one will have into time per se.  So consider again change.  
Above, I characterize it as the phenomenon that occurs when a thing is 
one way, then another, incompatible way.  Although, there have been 
those in the history of philosophy who have denied that there is change, I 
maintain that it must be real.  One experiences change confronting the 
world in original inquiry, that is, when making no assumptions about 
anything.  Distinct modes of differentiation are presented.  Either the 
world itself changes (going from thus to so) or, if the world is not a thing 
(and I do not think it is: the world is a plurality, namely, all things), there 
is change in the inquirer, who encounters the world as thus and (then) as 
so.  To deny change requires some argument ulterior to original inquiry.  
Any such argument or, for that matter, any argument at all itself requires 
change in some inquirer.  Premises must be presented sequentially, then 
considered (sequentially) and then some inference drawn.  Given that 
there is compelling reason to accept change—one experiences it in original 
inquiry—and that no argument can undermine it, I maintain change 
indeed occurs. 
Since change is real, there must be some explanation for it and this 
explanation must have an ontological basis among the things in the world 
(for there is, of course, nothing else).  Change requires incompatible ways.  
No one thing is incompatible in itself.  Change, therefore, is no one thing.  
Rather, change is what can be called a structural phenomenon, some plurality 
of things in relation.  If something changes, that thing is incompatible 
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ways, that is, bears inconsistent properties.  Since, again, nothing is 
incompatible in itself—a thing that were both p and not-p would be 
inherently contradictory and so is impossible—and yet there is change, 
there must be some thing distinct from the thing that undergoes change 
that accounts for how the former is incompatible ways.  Call whatever it 
is that accounts for how one thing is incompatible ways a moment.  Thus, 
when change occurs, something is one way at one moment and that very 
thing is an incompatible way at a distinct moment.  This is an elucidation 
of the plausible account of change adopted above, specifying the basis of 
the phenomenon in the world of things.  It reveals that change is several 
things in relation: at least one mutable thing, two properties and two 
moments.  Time is the thing that makes change possible; change requires 
moments.  This raises the question of how time is related to moments and 
what it is that can both underlie the explanation for the second mode of 
differentiation in the world and also be so related to moments.  Answering 
this question would illuminate what exactly this thing time is. 
I maintain that there must be some explanation for the second mode 
of differentiation evident in the world and, furthermore, that time is the 
ontological basis of this explanation.  Yet I also maintain that there is 
change and, hence, that there must be distinct moments.  If the existence 
of more than one moment underlies an account of change and change is 
just a manifestation of this second mode of differentiation—call it temporal 
differentiation—it might seem that moments suffice as the ontological basis 
of an explanation for temporal differentiation.  Distinct moments are not 
a thing, they are merely a plurality of things, and so one might claim that 
it is misguided to posit something—time itself—as the basis for such an 
explanation.  Thus, given the existence of moments, time might seem 
superfluous.  This is a reoccurrence of the idea, to wit, that time really is 
not anything at all, just an array of moments, floated and rejected above.  
One might see in the foregoing considerations new motivation for this 
idea; however, these considerations also provide the means to argue 
against it more conclusively. 
More is needed to account for the structural phenomenon of temporal 
differentiation and change than merely distinct moments.  These 
phenomena also require that moments be related in a certain way.  For, 
say, change to occur, a thing must be one way at one moment and an 
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incompatible way at a distinct moment that succeeds the first (or, conversely, 
a thing must be one way at a moment that precedes another moment at 
which it is an incompatible way). This structure—this plurality of things 
in constraining relations—comprising moments requires explanation.  Just 
adding the relation later than (or earlier than) to the complex of mutable 
thing, incompatible properties and moments will not do, for something is 
needed to account for how this relation is related to these other things in 
the appropriate ways (a Bradleyian regress threatens here).  Time is 
supposed to be the natured entity that underlies the explanation for the 
second mode of differentiation in the world, and so time is this needed 
thing.  It is time that accounts for how the world encountered in original 
inquiry is thus and then so.  In other words, it is in virtue of time that one 
moment is appropriately related to another by later than (or earlier than).  
Given change, there is no denying that moments are related in a distinctive 
way, one that need not inhere in them as instances of that kind of thing 
that enables a natured entity to be incompatible ways. Time, therefore, is 
the ontological basis of an explanation for what is naturally called the 
temporal order of moments. 
Note that the explanation for the order of moments, this distinctively 
temporal structure, cannot be based on any moment itself.  A moment is 
simply a natured entity that enables something to be incompatible ways.  
If one moment were to exist at another, and a thing can be incompatible 
ways at distinct moments, then it would be possible for something to be 
incompatible ways at the same moment. This is impossible, so distinct 
moments are mutually incongruous; each moment excludes every other.  
Nothing more seems to follow regarding the relations among moments 
merely considering a moment per se.  Yet if there are distinct moments, 
as there must be given temporal differentiation and change, these 
moments must be ordered.  Time is the thing that accounts for this order. 
Considering moments, there is no reason to think any particular 
moment must exist, and much reason for thinking each moment ceases to 
be.7  Yet, given that there is change, there must be some moment(s) or 
other(s). The necessary presence in the world of some moment(s), though 
any moment can fail to exist, is a structural phenomenon that requires an 
                                                 
7 See Fiocco 2014a. 
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explanation.  What is needed here is a sort of natural-cum-causal 
explanation, an account of how one thing comes to be given the existence 
of another. It is not necessary to explain how a particular moment is.  
There could be no such explanation, for there is no explaining a thing or 
its existence in this sense.  Nevertheless, how there are instances of a 
certain kind at all is amenable to explanation, and such an explanation is 
somewhat pressing if there is reason to think that there must be some 
instance of that kind though each one ceases to be.  The source of any 
moment could naturally determine the order of moments.  Therefore, 
since time is the thing that accounts for this order, it is plausible that time 
is also the source of each moment, the thing that underlies an explanation 
for the presence in the world of any such thing.  This conclusion confirms 
the claim that time is more than merely a plurality of moments. 
The world comprises things standing in constraining relations and time 
is one of these things.  Given this, time makes a contribution to the world 
that no other natured entity does.  It is the ontological basis of an (at least 
partial) explanation for the second mode of differentiation in the impetus 
to inquiry, accounting for how the world is thus and then so.  As such, time 
is the thing that enables change; it is in virtue of time that anything 
whatsoever changes.  Change requires moments ordered in a particular 
way.  So time enables change by being the source of any moment, as well 
as the thing that orders them.  This, then, is the answer to the question of 
what time is:  It is the natured entity that is the source of any moment and 
what orders any moment(s). 
 
 
V. What hangs on this answer? 
  
I have answered the question of what time is.  Since it seems clear from 
the foregoing discussion that time is sui generis, rather than an instance of 
some kind, I have answered this question by articulating the definitive 
features of time.  This answer has some value.  First of all, it makes clear 
what those who muse upon time or worry about it are musing upon or 
worrying about, namely, the thing that makes change possible, that thing 
that permits growth and decay, gain and loss.  The answer also illuminates 
what is or, at least, should be the focus of the philosophy of time.  Time 
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is the thing that underlies any temporal phenomenon, and so all accounts 
of these phenomena must ultimately be based on the thing that gives rise 
to and orders moments.  More importantly, however, I maintain that it is 
only by recognizing that time is a thing itself—and, more precisely, the 
one that makes change possible—that one can develop a comprehensive 
and fully satisfactory metaphysics of time. 
Investigations of the metaphysics of time are universally taken to reveal 
an irreconcilable tension.  This tension is characterized in different ways.  
Thus:  
[There are] two fundamentally different ways in which we conceive 
of and talk about time.  On  the one hand, we conceive of time 
in a dynamic or tensed way, as being the very quintessence  of 
flux and transiency...[On the other hand,] is the static or tenseless 
way of conceiving time, in  which the history of the world is 
viewed in a God-like manner, all events being given at once in a 
nunc stans.8 
 
And 
 
Distinctions and transitions of tense, between what has been, is 
and will be past, present and  future, divide philosophers into 
two fundamentally opposed camps.  The one, ‘tensed’, camp 
 takes these distinctions to reflect real nonrelational differences 
between past, present and  future things (events, facts, 
etc.)…that is what [those] in the ‘tenseless’ camp deny.9 
 
More recently and succinctly: 
 
Contemporary analytic metaphysics of time is shaped by the debate 
between A-theorists and B- theorists.10 
 
And 
 
                                                 
8 Gale 1967: 65-66. 
9 Mellor 1981: 4. 
10 Deng 2013: 713. 
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Metaphysical theories of time divide into A-theories and B-theories.11 
 
These characterizations of the tension do not make clear what its 
source is and, hence, it is not obvious what the disputes arising from this 
tension are really about.  Although the characterizations suggest—or in 
some cases explicitly state—that the tension pertains to time, or different 
theories thereof, the lack, in these investigations, of any account of what 
time itself is belies this. 
Perhaps the only claim that can be taken for granted in contemporary 
discussions of the metaphysics of time is that time exists.12  There is, then, 
some common ground among those investigating the metaphysics of time.  
If any progress is to be made from this common ground, an 
uncontroversial account of what time is is required.  The account I 
propound is not based on any contentious assumptions.  Indeed, it is not 
based on any assumption at all.  It arises through original inquiry, by 
encountering the world as the impetus to inquiry, noting that it is 
differentiated in distinct modes and recognizing that this phenomenon 
must be explicable in terms of what exists.  Because it arises in this way, 
and is so minimal, it is hard to see how anyone could deny this account of 
time, or why anyone would want to.  So here is the required account. 
If this is what time is, however, the tension that is supposed to be 
central to investigations of the metaphysics of time vanishes.  Time per se 
is no series, so a fortiori it is neither an A-series nor a B-series; it is itself 
neither tensed nor tenseless, transient nor static.  Harmony is achieved.  
Yet such quick resolution of these hoary disputes is hardly satisfying.  
What this dissatisfaction indicates is not that there is some problem with 
this ecumenical account of time; rather, it shows that these disputes 
ostensibly about time (or theories thereof) actually have a different focus. 
If one accepts that there is time and at least one moment, one can see 
that these disputes are more about these moments of time (and the things 
that exist at them); they concern the properties of moments, their 
relations, the extent of them.  In other words, the disputes are about the 
                                                 
11 Deasy 2016. 
12 McTaggart, of course, denied this.  See McTaggart 1908. 
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relations among distinctively temporal entities (moments, temporal 
properties, temporal relations, etc.), i.e., the structure in temporal reality.  Thus, 
there is, among others, a dispute concerning whether moments have 
absolute monadic temporal properties and stand in temporal relations or 
just stand in temporal relations; a dispute concerning whether moments 
(and the things that exist at them) come into being or exist permanently at 
some temporal location; a dispute concerning whether there is more than 
one moment with the same ontological standing; a dispute concerning 
whether the properties of moments make them dynamic in some sense.  
There are several disputes here, not one of which pertains to time per se, 
and not one of which is primary in the sense that one must accept one of 
the disputed positions and one’s choice there determines one’s position 
on every other dispute.  None of these disputes, therefore, reveals the 
central tension in investigations of the metaphysics of time.   
In fact, these disputes might seem puzzlingly trivial.  One might 
wonder why anyone would care to argue about, say, the properties of 
moments or how many there are.  What is missing is a view of the real 
bone of contention in discussions of the metaphysics of time, what it is 
that motivates any of these disputes in the first place.  By examining the 
disputes together, rather than the details of any one of them, one can see 
that each arises in connection with a phenomenon that all those who 
investigate the metaphysics of time acknowledge.  Regardless of how one 
identifies (A-theorist, B-theorist, tensed theorist, tenseless theorist, 
presentist, block theorist, etc.) one concedes that there is a compelling 
impression of novelty arising from one’s experience of being in a world with 
time.  This impression has traditionally been characterized as a sense of 
passage or flow and is really nothing more than an awareness of the second 
mode of differentiation in original inquiry—that awareness of the world 
being thus and then so—accounted for in terms of time itself.  
Accompanying this impression of novelty, however, is one of permanence 
that is no less evident.  Given that the world is now thus, it seems that this 
never changes, that it must always be the case that the world is thus at this 
moment.  Yet, obviously, things do change for the world is now so. 
This last observation need not be incompatible with it always being 
true that things and, hence, the world were a different way a moment ago.  
Thus, the real bone of contention in investigations of the metaphysics of 
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time, the motivation for all the disputes one encounters therein, is how to 
reconcile the undeniable impression of novelty in the world with the 
commensurately compelling impression of permanence.  Some 
metaphysicians of time take more seriously the permanence, and try to 
account for the impression of novelty by the means they employ to explain 
this permanence.  Others take more seriously the novelty, and try to 
account for the impression of permanence in terms of what underlies this 
novelty.  There is a divide, then, between those who take the world to be 
fundamentally permanent and those who take it to be fundamentally 
transient.  This conflict between permanence and transience is supposed 
to be unavoidable when investigating the metaphysics of time and, as 
illustrated by the quotations above, usually provides the framework for 
these investigations.  Acquiescing to this framework has led to impasse. 
A comprehensive metaphysics of time provides the means to account for 
every temporal phenomena.  Insofar as both transience and permanence 
are irrefragable phenomena, a fully satisfactory metaphysics of time accounts 
for both without neglecting either.  Thus, a comprehensive and fully 
satisfactory metaphysics of time would resolve the tension between the 
transience and permanence in the world.  Since no thing in itself is both 
transient and permanent, if the central disputes regarding the metaphysics 
of time concerned a single thing—time or the world, were it a thing13—
the tension giving rise to these disputes would indeed be irresolvable.  
Transience would have to be accounted for haphazardly in terms of things 
best-suited to explain permanence or vice versa; there could be no fully 
satisfactory metaphysics of time.  This is why it is so important to 
recognize what these disputes are really about.  They are not about time 
alone, but about time and the structure it renders.  Realizing this presents 
the prospect of finding a place for both transience and permanence in this 
structure and, hence, in the world more generally. 
The key to a fully satisfactory metaphysics of time is distinguishing 
between the world in time and the world outside of time.  This spatial locution 
is merely suggestive; the operative notion of inclusion has not to do with 
space, but with ontological dependence, the necessary relations between things 
                                                 
13 As mentioned above, I do not think the world is a natured entity.  Rather, it is 
a plurality of things, to wit, all things. 
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given what those things are.  As a thing, time is in the world.  There are 
some things that are ontologically dependent on time, in that, given what 
they are, they cannot exist in the absence of time.  These things together, 
this plurality, is what above I dub temporal reality, the world in time.  There 
are, however, other things that are ontologically independent of time, in 
that they do not have to exist with time merely given what they are.  The 
plurality of these things is atemporal reality, the world outside of time.   
It is here that having an account of what time is is imperative.  The 
account provides the insight required to elaborate the distinction between 
temporal and atemporal reality.  Time is the thing that makes change 
possible by yielding and ordering moments.  Any moment, then, 
ontologically depends on time.  The mark of existing in time is existing at 
a moment thereby poised to change.  Any mutable thing must exist at a 
moment and so any such thing is ontologically dependent on time.  
Transience involves change in a way consistent with the compelling 
impression of novelty.  Therefore, one can expect the transience in the 
world to be accounted for in terms of those things that ontologically 
depend on time.  Those things that do not ontologically depend on time 
do not, cannot, exist at a moment (otherwise they would depend on time) 
and so these things do not (cannot) change.  One can expect, then, the 
permanence in the world to be accounted for in terms of these atemporal 
things.  If the real bone of contention in investigations of the metaphysics 
of time is how to reconcile the indisputable impressions of novelty and 
permanence, then by recognizing the world in time and the world outside 
of time one can discern the proper domain of transience and permanence, 
and so do justice to both, thereby allaying any tension between them.  
Crucial to recognizing both the world in time and without it—the full 
structure in reality—is having the proposed account of what time is and 
appreciating the distinction between time itself and temporal reality. 
An account of what time is is essential to a comprehensive metaphysics 
of time, for it provides its foundation; furthermore, as just observed, such 
an account is of the utmost importance in articulating a fully satisfactory 
metaphysics of time.  Yet there is still much to be done to attain this 
metaphysics.  One must give an account of the structure in temporal reality 
consistent not only with change, but with the impression of novelty.  One 
must give an account of atemporal reality, what exists outside of time, in 
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terms that illuminate the permanence of the world.  I have started these 
projects elsewhere, providing a presentist account of the world in time14 
and an account of the simple facts that structure the world without time 
and, thus, timelessly ground one’s true claims about all the things that 
change and cease to be15. 
The purpose of this paper, though, is to demonstrate that one cannot 
have a genuine sense of the basis of or the motivation for modern 
discussions of the metaphysics of time without first having an account of 
what time is.  Without such an account, there is no way to move beyond 
the familiar disputes—and the impasse—in these discussions.  However, 
with such an account, there is the promise of a comprehensive and fully 
satisfactory metaphysics of time. 
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